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**PRESIDENTIAL STRATEGIC LAW.
STATE RESPONSE TO HYBRID, BELOW THE THRESHOLD
OF WAR AND CONVENTIONAL THREATS.**

Abstract:

Due to increased external threats to the security of the state, caused by the actions of the Russian Federation, the National Security Bureau was tasked by the President of the Republic of Poland Andrzej Duda to work on defining the main areas within the national security system which required changes and adaptation to new threats. Such work was carried out by the Bureau in late 2022 and early 2023. After conducting, in January 2023, the biggest simulation exercises after 1989, with the participation of the highest state authorities, and following the analysis of the hostilities in Ukraine, as well as the emergency situations related to them which occurred in the Polish territory, the President of the Republic of Poland concluded that the priority areas requiring reforms were: state security management system, defense planning, command and control of the Polish Armed Forces. The proposed regulations were included in the draft law on the directions of action of the state authorities in case of an external threat to the state, published on August 16, 2023. One of the main goals of the draft law is to ensure the adaptation of the security system to conventional, hybrid and sub-threshold threats, the improvement of flexibility and speed of response to them, as well as the maximum alignment of the structures and procedures applied in time of war and in time of peace. Submitting a strategic legislative initiative by the President of the Republic of Poland is dictated by the constitutional role performed by the Head of State which boils down to guarding the sovereignty and security as well as inviolability and indivisibility of the territory of the Republic of

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Poland, including special competences of the President of Poland as the one who directs the defense of state in time of war.

Keywords:

State security system, defense planning, command and control system, state resilience, external threats to state security

Introduction

The presidential draft law on the directions of action taken by state authorities in the event of an external threat to the security of the state was published on the website of the Polish Parliament, on August 16, 2023³. The document, prepared in the National Security Bureau and consulted with the Ministry of Defense, envisages the introduction of changes in the military and non-military areas, aimed at strengthening the capabilities of the Polish state in countering hybrid, below-the-threshold threats and conventional armed aggression. The detailed solutions of the presidential draft include changes to the system of managing state security, strengthening the defense planning system and reforming the system of command and control of the Polish Armed Forces. The initiative of Polish President Andrzej Duda also constitutes the first stage in a series of changes to the national security system, and implements the conclusions and experiences of several months during which the state has functioned in perilous conditions, not faced by Poland for decades. Thus, the draft law should be viewed from the angle of the President of the Republic of Poland's strategic intention to comprehensively regulate formal issues pertaining to state security.

³ Draft law presented by the President of the Republic of Poland on the Directions of Action Undertaken by the State Authorities in the Event of an External Threat to State Security, <https://www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm9.nsf/PrzebiegProc.xsp?id=75B50FD22641C88FC1258A0E0031A281>, accessed (September 5, 2023).

The role of the President of the Republic of Poland in the realm of national security

The President's presentation of the draft law is related to the special role in the realm of national security played by the President of the Republic of Poland, who serves as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces under the Polish system.

It should be noted that while the burden of responsibility for national security in peacetime rests with the governmental structures, in wartime the President of the Republic of Poland, upon the appointment of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, directs the defense of the state and acts jointly with the Council of Ministers.

The key power of the Head of State is enshrined in Article 136 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, according to which, in the event of a direct external threat to the state, the President, at the request of the Prime Minister, orders the general or partial mobilization and the use of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland to defend the state⁴.

All decisions on the use and mobilization of the Armed Forces, which are of key importance for the defense of the state, must be accompanied by a series of prior preparatory activities in the military and non-military spheres. Hence the powers of the President of the Republic of Poland include the following:

- submitting recommendations to the Council of Ministers for the draft National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland and its subsequent approval. The said Strategy is the main national document which defines the interests of the state, its strategic goals, as well as the means of achieving them;
- issuing the Political-Strategic Defense Directive of the Republic of Poland, defining the tasks of the state's structures in time of war;

⁴ Constitution of the Republic of Poland, <https://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/polski/kon1.htm>, (September 5, 2023).

- determining the main directions of development of the Armed Forces and their preparation for the defense of the state with priorities defined for the period of fifteen years;
- approving national plans for the use of the Armed Forces in defense of the state, as well as organizing and setting principles of operation of the war-time command system of the Armed Forces;
- identifying the person scheduled for appointment to the position of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and appointing the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces for the time of war;
- approving plans for national defense system exercises and directing their conduct;
- deciding on the introduction or change of a specific state of state defense readiness;
- defining, should it be necessary to defend the state, the day on which the time of war begins and the day on which the time of war ends on the territory of the Republic of Poland⁵.

The above-listed powers give the President of the Republic of Poland a special authorization to formulate expectations concerning legislative solutions which, also in peacetime, must be designed with a view to “equipping” the office of the President and creating appropriate conditions for the effective exercise of presidential powers in times of crisis.

Increased external threats to state security

The submitting of proposals for organizational and doctrinal changes, as well as the development of legislation able to tackle new forms of threats, stems from the analysis of the aggressive policy of the Russian Federation, starting from the annexation of Crimea in 2014 to the illegal aggression against Ukraine as part of the “special military

⁵ Law of March 11, 2022 on Defense of Homeland, Journal of Laws 2022 item 655, <https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=WDU20220000655>, (September 5, 2023).

operation” carried out on February 24, 2022. The need for systemic changes was pointed out in the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland approved by the President of the Republic as early as in 2020. It stressed the progressive decomposition of the international environment and highlighted the need to introduce coherent, comprehensive legal solutions aimed at creating an integrated system of state security management⁶. At the same time, even prior to the full-scale aggression against Ukraine, analyses of Russian activities clearly suggested the build-up of offensive military capabilities in the western strategic direction, the development of A2/AD systems *inter alia* in the Baltic region, including the Kaliningrad oblast, and the conduct of large-scale exercises based on scenarios involving rapid redeployment of large groups of troops and a conflict with NATO countries, up to the use of nuclear weapons⁷.

We are also witnessing a systematically growing threat posed by Russian hybrid activities and actions conducted below the threshold of war, with a risk of a regional conflict breaking out. Furthermore, Russia has embarked on comprehensive and complex projects in the non-military area, aimed at destabilizing the structures of the Western countries and societies and causing divisions among NATO and the EU. It is fair to assume that with the depletion of Russian military potential, the most likely scenario, which must be taken into account by the Polish authorities, will consist in further intensification of hybrid actions against Ukraine, and against Western states.

For this reason, the National Security Bureau’s analysis accounted for situations bearing the attributes of a security crisis on the territory of Poland, directly related to the conflict in Ukraine, which highlighted the need for changes in the Polish legal and organizational system. Such incidents encompassed, but were not limited to, the

⁶ National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, Warsaw 2020, p. 9, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKewj_6J3exZOBAXWHJxAIHfLuDPAQFnoECBwQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bbn.gov.pl%2Fftp%2Fdokumenty%2FStrategia_Bezpieczenstwa_Narodowe_RP_2020.pdf&usg=AOvVaw34R_KDorppr0YEHRRJ1SBG&opi=89978449, (September 5, 2023).

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 6.

tragic events in Przewodów⁸ as well as the Russia-inspired provocations in the vicinity of Poland's border with Belarus. For the Polish President, the key issue was to comprehensively analyze the situation and draw conclusions that could be translated into civilian and military procedures.

High-level Table Top Exercises

In view of the growing security risks in the region, in January and May 2023, the National Security Bureau conducted the largest high-level TTX (Table Top Exercise) simulation exercise after 1989. The exercise followed several months of preparations and was attended by the President of Poland, the Prime Minister, Speakers of the Sejm and the Senate, the Heads of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Heads of Intelligence and top military commanders. The goal was to test the functioning of state structures in the event of an armed conflict.

The exercises showed that the security conditions in place, including in particular the intensification of hybrid actions below the threshold of war directed against Poland, necessitate the adaptation and more precise assignment of responsibilities to state defense management bodies, systematization and clarification of links between them as well as areas of cooperation. The exercise also highlighted that in the face of rapid changes in the security environment and new forms of influence exerted by the enemy, the decision-making process on the use of military and non-military tools by state authorities is characterized by considerable pressure of time, while the whole process is hampered by the undefined scope of competencies under the applicable normative acts.

⁸ On November 15, 2022, a missile fired by Ukrainian anti-aircraft defenses repulsing a Russian air attack fell in the village of Przewodów (Hrubieszów County, Lublin Province), located near the border with Ukraine. The explosion resulted in the deaths of two Polish citizens.

Practical conclusions from the exercise, which can be presented to the general public, included:

- the need to optimize the processes of developing, approving and updating key operational planning documents, in particular the Political-Strategic Defense Directive and national plans for the use of the Armed Forces for defense of the state;
- the involvement of key state defense management bodies in the process of operational planning within the Armed Forces as early as at the stage of developing the concept of operations, including national plans for the use of the Armed Forces for defense of the state;
- the need to include the Speaker of the Sejm and the Speaker of the Senate in the system of permanent duty and state defense command posts, ensuring that they maintain full situational awareness.

Areas of state defense requiring new legal regulations

Based on the conclusions stemming from the exercises, inspections, analyses of the Russian Federation's doctrine-related documents and the ongoing hostilities in Ukraine, the National Security Bureau worked from February to May 2023 to identify key areas requiring changes or new statutory regulations in the field of state defense. These include:

- development of defense strategies and rules for their implementation;
- development of strategic decisions by state authorities in the event of an external threat to state security;
- the principles of strategic use of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland for defense of the state;
- reform of the command and control system concerning the functioning of the wartime command system;
- commanding a defense operation by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces when an allied operation is held simultaneously

on the territory of the Republic of Poland, following the activation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty;

- strengthening the resilience of the state, including securing the operations of entrepreneurs amidst progressing political-military crisis and during hostilities;
- social risks related to civil protection, including civil defense and solutions pertaining to the national rescue system.
- Taking into account the geopolitical situation, the President of the Republic of Poland decided on the following priorities in the area of legislation: the need to regulate the actions of state authorities in the event of an external threat to state security, clarification of the principles of planning and strategic use of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland in defense of the state, and reform of the command and control system of the Armed Forces.

In other areas the National Security Bureau will be developing further recommendations and proposals for legislative changes as part of the overall concept of adapting the national security system to contemporary challenges. At the same time, these changes will complement, in a systemic way, the reform which enables exponential modernization and expansion of human resources in the Polish Armed Forces, which is so fundamental to their functioning, and which was introduced by the Act on the Defense of Homeland, of March 11, 2022⁹.

Concepts forming the basis for work on legal regulations

In accordance with the conclusions developed by the National Security Bureau, the general idea behind the work on the draft law on the directions of action taken by state authorities in the event of an external threat to state security encompassed: putting in place highly flexible and logical processes which would provide the basis for

⁹ Law of March 11, 2022 on Defense ..., paraphrase of the quote.

the competencies of the authorities, their decisions and principles of action; ensuring the economy of action in terms of time, personnel and finance; defining responsibility in accordance with the principle: “you plan, you train, you command, you bear responsibility” as part of the command and control reform; maximal approximation of “P” time and “W” time structures, both in the management as well as the command and control system; emphasizing the need to protect the civilian population and the functioning of entrepreneurs amid defense operations.

It was also assumed that the proposed changes should aim to eliminate all ambiguities in the areas of competence of public and military authorities and eliminate areas of discretion in the decision-making process, thereby ensuring compliance with Article 26(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and its proper implementation, which states that civilian and democratic control over the Armed Forces should be preserved and that the military should maintain neutrality in political affairs¹⁰. It was also necessary to clarify the existing solutions to ensure an unambiguous understanding of the matters subject to legal regulation, which would support a rapid decision-making process in the event of emergence of threats in a state of permanent state defense readiness.

Amid drafting works it was noted that gradual and proportional response to threats should occur through selective activation of the defense system, without unnecessary limitation of subjective rights and preventing a situation when the economy would become part of the defense processes. Switching to the “warfare mode”, both in terms of the economy and the society, will be necessary exclusively in a state of full state defense readiness. Accordingly, all preparatory activities, repelling hybrid threats, developing defense systems, including war-time ones, should take place in a state of permanent state defense readiness.

It was also crucial to take into account the fact that the security system is susceptible to sub-threshold actions which exploit imprecise

¹⁰ Constitution ..., paraphrase of the quote.

legal regulations, competence doubts, divergent assessments, opinions and institutional disputes, which can result in doubts during the decision-making process or lead to wrong decisions being taken. In the military domain they boil down *inter alia* to: the initiation of such actions by external forces which complicate risk assessment of a conflict flaring-up, on the basis of legal premises, which allow certain decisions to be taken under national law and international agreements. Through precise regulations, the draft law envisages to minimize hostile interference in the area of defense planning and response.

Detailed scope of regulation of the presidential draft law

The essential solutions contained in the draft law are included in the following ten areas:

- 1) **Organization of the state security management system.** The draft law defines the principles of state security management designed to ensure, among other things, an effective response to emerging threats. It emphasizes the need to preserve the ability of the authorities to manage state security through the establishment of both main and back-up command posts. This step ensures that preparatory measures would be taken to enable uninterrupted transition to back-up posts. Bearing in mind the role of the Speaker of the Sejm and the Speaker of the Senate in the constitutional system, with regard to their temporary performance of the duties of the President of the Republic of Poland, as well as the need to preserve the continuity of state leadership (the role of the Sejm and the Senate during martial law and wartime), these organs are now included in the state security management system.
- 2) **Determination of states of defense readiness of the state and of relevant actions to be taken in these states.** This is one of the basic issues with regard to the possibility of activating elements of the defense system relevant to the threat.

Currently, there are no such regulations defined by Acts of Law, whereas the existing solutions enshrined in executive acts are not relevant to counter current threats, including hybrid ones. Under the new regulations a state of permanent state defense readiness and a state of full state defense readiness shall be established. Another important point has been introduced, which tackles hybrid threats in practice. In a state of permanent state defense readiness, preparations can be made to develop a war-time command system to the extent resulting from the documents approved by the President of the Republic of Poland. In a state of full state defense readiness, tasks may be carried out that enable the full development of the state defense system to repel an armed attack on the territory of the Republic of Poland.

- 3) **Clarification of the system of permanent duty.** In addition to state and local government bodies, the permanent duty system also includes the Speaker of the Sejm, the Speaker of the Senate and the Head of the National Security Bureau. It also ensures that the Prime Minister immediately informs the President of the Republic of Poland of the identified threats that may be significant to the security of the state, of the identified threats that may be significant to the international position of the Republic of Poland, as well as of the type and outcome of actions taken to counter threats to security of the state and eliminating their consequences.
- 4) **Defining the goal and structure of the Political-Strategic Defense Directive.** Defining the procedure for developing, implementing and amending the Political-Strategic Defense Directive is key to the proper implementation of tasks envisaged in the Polish Defense Response Plan and in the national plans for the use of the Armed Forces to defend the state. To date, the subject matter of the Political-Strategic Defense Directive of the Republic of Poland has not been regulated, despite the fact that the Directive is an executive document to the National Security Strategy and forms the basis for the development of other strategic documents. The proposed solutions define the

scope of regulation of the Political-Strategic Defense Directive of the Republic of Poland, which includes, among other things: a strategic analysis of the security environment and its characteristics; the main threats to the security of the state; planning situations with the intent to provide a defensive response taking into account the military and non-military systems; political goals specifying aspirations arising from national interests and strategic objectives; and the political, expected end-state following the completion of the operation, taking into account diplomatic, economic, social and humanitarian conditions.

- 5) **Clarification of the provisions of the Polish Defense Response Plan.** A key role in this regard will be played by the correlation between the Defense Response Plan of the Republic of Poland and the layout and assumptions adopted within the framework of the crisis management system projects, resulting from Poland's membership in the North Atlantic Alliance. In accordance with the proposed solutions the Defense Response Plan of the Republic of Poland shall be prepared by the Minister of National Defense on the basis of the conclusions adopted in the Strategy of the National Security of the Republic of Poland and the Political-Strategic Defense Directive of the Republic of Poland, in consultation with the authorities indicated by the Prime Minister, according to their competence, as well as with the Head of the National Security Bureau, the Head of the Internal Security Agency and the Head of the Intelligence Agency. The activation of tasks resulting from the Defense Response Plan of the Republic of Poland shall follow the decision by the Prime Minister.
- 6) **Clarification of the principles governing activation of national plans for the use of the Armed Forces in defense of the state.** The proposed Law regulates the response to external threats to the state, which until now have resulted, only in general terms, from the Constitution of the Republic of Poland with regard to the use of the Armed Forces. Considering the current realities, under the Act of August 29, 2002 on martial law and

the competencies of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the principles of his subordination to the constitutional bodies of the Republic of Poland, it is necessary to give up the operational plan for the use of the Armed Forces, as separate from the national plans for the use of the Armed Forces, and replace it with a plan for a defense operation. The results of national exercises and experiences resulting from the war in Ukraine clearly show that the most important issue is the timing and flexibility of action. It is therefore inappropriate to develop an operational plan for the use of troops only after the appointment of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, who may be appointed after the imposition of martial law¹¹. The military and non-military systems must respond to threats on the basis of the existing documents and rehearsed situations. For this reason, the President of the Republic of Poland may indicate, via an order for the use of the Armed Forces, one of the national plans for the use of the Armed Forces, which will provide the basis for actions aimed at countering external threats. As soon as the President of the Republic of Poland issues the order, one of the national plans for the use of the Armed Forces shall become a defense operation plan.

- 7) **Implementation of permanent defense plans.** The draft introduces a new solution in the form of permanent defense plans, which are developed to counter threats arising suddenly or emerging at short notice, including hybrid ones. This includes measures to counter malign actions in cyberspace. In particular, permanent defense plans specify the assigned forces and the tasks of the Armed Forces carried out as part of military operations. Furthermore, the size of the assigned forces has been scaled-down to the level of units and sub-units. It is also important to note that no mobilization shall be carried out under

¹¹ 11 The Act of August 29, 2002 on Martial Law and the Powers of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the Principles of his Subordination to the Constitutional Bodies of the Republic of Poland, Journal of Laws 2002 No. 156 item 1301, <https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=WDU20021561301>, (September 5, 2023).

the permanent defense plans, and that the assignment and use of the Armed Forces may not jeopardize combat capability of units envisaged for use under national plans for the use of the Armed Forces. The draft envisages that the Armed Forces assigned under permanent defense plans will be commanded by a person indicated by the Minister of National Defense. An urgent mode is also provided for. Under this mode, the Minister of Defense may make a decision on the use of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland and immediately notify the Prime Minister of that fact as well as request the approval by President of the Republic of Poland. The President of the Republic of Poland shall immediately decide on either approving or revoking the above-mentioned decision. A possibility is also provided to devise a permanent defense plan for Cyber Defense Forces, allowing for active defense of elements and resources of cyberspace that are key from the perspective of the Armed Forces.

- 8) **Clarifying the rules for the use of weapons, armaments and means of direct coercion by the Armed Forces in a state of permanent state defense readiness.** A catalog of powers related to the use of weapons, application of direct coercion and use of other armaments is listed in the Act on the Defense of Homeland. Particularization of these issues will ensure clarity and unambiguity regarding the powers held by soldiers who take part in military operations. Soldiers shall have the right to pre-emptively apply direct coercive measures, use weapons, other armaments and any other means permitted by international law in self-defense, to protect equipment and the area of deployment. While in action the units and sub-units of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland may apply direct coercive measures, use weapons and other armaments only upon the order of the commander, as a special and last-resort measure. Weapons and other armaments should be used in a manner and with an intensity proportional to the threat, causing the least possible damage and not exposing other persons, especially bystanders, to the danger of the loss of life or health.

Insofar as the situation permits and unless this is the direct goal of the task, the use of weapons and other armaments against a person should not aim to take their life.

- 9) **Clarification of provisions in the area of defense programming.** In this area, the tasks of the President of the Republic of Poland and those of the Council of Ministers in issuing the main and detailed directions of the development of the Armed Forces have been unified. Under the proposed solution, the detailed directives of the Council of Ministers shall correspond to the main directions specified by the President of the Republic of Poland, thereby ensuring the proper application of Article 10(2) of the Polish Constitution.
- 10) **Organizational changes to the highest command structures of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland.** The draft provides for the transformation of the Operational Command of the Branches of the Armed Forces and the General Command of the Branches of the Armed Forces into the Joint Command of the Branches of the Armed Forces. At the same time, the following entities shall be established: Land Forces Command, Air Force Command and Navy Command. The law also envisages the subordination of Territorial Defense Forces to the Joint Force Commander, and setting-up Medical Forces as a specialized component responsible for medical security of troops.

The solutions concerning organizational changes to the top command structures adopted in the draft by the National Security Bureau and the Ministry of Defense are based, among other things, on the results of the exercises ZIMA-17 and ZIMA-20, as well as on a comprehensive analysis of the security system, culminating in the TTX exercises carried out in January and May 2023. The purpose of the Exercise ZIMA-17 was, among other things, to verify the army's command and control system.¹² In the face of competence-related problems between the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish

¹² M. Kowalska-Sendek, "ZIMA-17": a test of the new army command system, <https://polska-zbrojna.pl/home/articleshow/21872?t=-Zima-17-sprawdzian-nowego-sys-temu-dowodzenia-armia>, (September 7, 2023).

Armed Forces, the Operational Commander of the Armed Forces and the General Commander of the Armed Forces, the exercise served to carry out an initial verification of the new command system of the Polish Armed Forces. As part of the Exercise ZIMA-20, the command structures of the Armed Forces in peacetime and in wartime were checked and all procedures applied in case of the strategic defense of the state were tested¹³.

The need to implement changes was signaled in the past by the President of Poland at briefings held with the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the Polish Armed Forces, at which the President instructed that analyses be conducted with a view to improving the command and control system. Moreover, the Minister of National Defense announced the reinstatement of the Armed Forces Commands back in 2018 when, changes were introduced in the command system¹⁴.

In view of the above, the draft law proposes to establish a new position of a Joint Force Commander, whose responsibilities would primarily include: participation in the operational planning process at the strategic level and the development of the organization and rules of operation of the wartime command system of the Armed Forces; translating strategic intentions and objectives (as part of the concepts and plans developed at the operational level) into operational goals and objectives for the subordinate forces; planning and organizing mobilization and operational development of subordinate forces; ensuring and supervising the maintenance of operational capabilities and the required indicators of mobilization and combat readiness in subordinate organizational and military units; organizing tasks in the area of military logistics in subordinate organizational and military units; planning, organizing and conducting joint operations and

¹³ The President of the Republic of Poland took part in the summary of the “ZIMA-20” staff exercises, <https://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/wydarzenia/prezydent-rp-wzial-udzial-w-podsumowaniu-cwiczen-sztabowych,2028>, (September 5, 2023).

¹⁴ New Command and Control System is already in place, <https://www.gov.pl/web/obrona-narodowa/nowy-system-kierownia-i-dowodzenia-juz-obowiazuje>, (September 7, 2023).

commanding subordinate forces; preparing the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

The maintenance of the current legal situation with regard to the status of the Commander of Special Forces has raised some doubts – special forces are a branch of the Armed Forces, but their commander is not a commander of a branch of forces. Thus, the draft stipulates that the commanders of forces with the ability to conduct independent operations in their respective domains (land – the Commander of the Land Forces and the Commander of the Territorial Defense Forces in the rear area of operations; air – the Commander of the Air Force; naval – the Commander of the Navy) shall be recognized as commanders of the branches of the Armed Forces. The Special Force Component would then be used to support the operations of the Joint Commander, as well as the branches of the Armed Forces. In peacetime, the Special Force Component Commander shall report directly to the Minister of Defense (just like the Cyber Defense Force Component Commander and the Medical Force Component Commander). Upon appointment and assumption of command by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the following commanders shall report directly to him: Joint Force Commander, Head of the Armed Forces Support Inspectorate and the previously mentioned commanders subordinated in peacetime to the Minister of National Defense.

Conclusion

According to all assessments available today, tensions will continue to run high in international politics with a growing risk of escalation of hybrid threats, directed primarily against Poland and the countries of the region. From this perspective, the adoption of the solutions proposed in the draft law, adapting the security system to the specified areas of risk is key to ensuring the ability of the Armed Forces to respond in a relevant way, to threats and is regarded as a priority by the President of the Republic of Poland.

It should be emphasized that the implementation of the systemic changes described above is the most cost-effective way to enhance the security of the country and should go hand in hand with technical modernization of the Armed Forces covering all domains of operation. We should also consider systemic changes an element of deterrence policy, an effective manifestation of the determination to defend the Republic of Poland.

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